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Rigsby: The Business Purpose Doctrine

THE BUSINESS PURPOSE DOCTRINE
IN CORPORATE DIVISIONS
STEPHEN RIGSBY*
INTRODUCTION

F

shareholders may find it either necessary
or desirable to effect a division of their corporation. The division of a
corporation may refer to the creation of a subsidiary corporation or to the
distribution to the shareholders of the stock of either an existing or a newly
created subsidiary corporation. It is in the latter sense that this paper will
refer to corporate division.
OR A VARIETY OF REASONS,

The usual result of a corporate division is that the shareholders' investment is unliquidated, although it will be in a modified corporate form. In
keeping with business needs and realities, the Internal Revenue Code provides
that many corporate divisions result in no taxation. Since the investment is
continued, taxation is deferred until a more appropriate time.
The corporate division, however, lends itself to schemes for avoidance
of tax. These schemes are attempts to convert ordinary income into income
taxable at capital gains rates. An elaborate statutory mechanism has been
created to prevent this conversion. In addition, the courts have created
judicial doctrines which sometimes work by adding to the statutory framework
and sometimes overlap. The resulting confusion of statute and judicial
doctrine is the subject of this article. The investigation will focus on that
part of the statute known as the device clause and its interaction with the
judicial doctrines which together are known as the business purpose doctrine.
First will be considered the origins of the problem found in case law
and in the legislative response before 1954. Then the statute in its present
form and the cases decided since the enactment of Section 355 will be examined in detail. Finally, a new judicial trend will be considered and a
modification proposed.
I. REASONS

FOR AND MECHANICS OF THE CORPORATE DIVISION

The reasons for a corporate division may be as varied and as complex
as the economic life of the country but despite this, certain reasons for
corporate divisions are found frequently in the cases and rulings in this
area.
One of the reasons which is often advanced for the division of a
corporation owned by a single shareholder is to facilitate his estate planning.
*Private practice, member of Texas Bar; J.D., LLM., University of Texas at Austin.
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The corporation may have two businesses which the shareholder may desire
to leave to different beneficiaries. The shareholder may also want to divide
the corporation in such a manner that some beneficiaries actively manage
the business while other beneficiaries are excluded from active management
but nonetheless are provided with a source of steady income.' In addition,
a corporation may be engaged in the management of two or more businesses,
one of which is considerably less stable than the others. In order to protect
the stable businesses from the creditors of the unstable business, it may be
desired to separate the businesses by means of a corporate division.' Where
a corporation is owned equally by two shareholders, it may become necessary
to effect a division of the corporation when the shareholders can no longer
agree as to corporate policy and management.' In the context of a corporation
with a larger number of shareholders, the majority shareholders may want
to spin-off part of the corporation to eliminate a group of dissident shareholders.'
A variety of other reasons may prompt a corporate division as
well. In one reported case, a parent corporation was involved in a labor
dispute and a spin-off of a subsidiary was regarded as necessary to prevent
the spread of labor difficulties.' Some corporations engage in two businesses
which are such that the customers of one business are in competition with
the other corporate business. In this situation, customer objections to doing
business with a competitor may force a division.6 A division of the corporation may be necessary in order to facilitate a merger with a company which
does not want to acquire the subsidiary." In some instances, the success or
failure of the corporate venture may depend on the presence or absence of
a key employee and to retain that employee, it may be necessary to let him
participate in the ownership of the corporation. Where the cost of the stock
is too great for the key employee or where the owners do not wish the
employee to have an interest in the entire corporation, a division will be
necessary.' Corporations are organized frequently with two or more businesses. It may become apparent with the passage of time that the businesses
cannot be operated efficiently together, and thus a corporate division is

I See

Parshelsky's Estate v. Commissioner, 9 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 1382 (2d Cir. 1962).
2 This was one of the reasons advanced for separation of real estate consisting of land
and a large building from a corporation engaged in the business of operating an automobile
dealership in Bondy v. Commissioner, 4 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d (4th Cir. 1959).
3 See Albert W. Badanes, 39 T.C. 410 (1962).
4See
Rev. Rul. 75-469, 1975-2 CUM. BULL. 126.
5

Sidney L. Olson, 48 T.C. 855 (1967).

6 See H. Grady Lester, Jr., 40 T.C. 947 (1963).

See Rev. Rul. 72-530, 1972-2 CUM. BULL. 212.

8 See Rev. Rul. 69-460, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 212.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol11/iss2/3
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necessary.' Finally, to complete this survey, it should be noted that a corporate division may sometimes be required by a regulatory agency. 10
A. Methods of CorporateDivision
A corporation may be divided in one of three ways which are known
as the spin-off, the split-off and the split-up. The spin-off is accomplished
by first creating a new corporation. The parent corporation then transfers
assets to the new corporation, in exchange for all of its stock. This stock is
distributed to the shareholders of the parent corporation.
The mechanics of the split-off are similar, except that the shareholders
of the parent corporation surrender a portion of their stock in the old corporation in exchange for the stock of the new corporation.
In a split-up, the parent corporation creates two new corporations and
transfers its assets to them in exchange for their stock. The stock is distributed
to the shareholders of the parent, and it is liquidated.
I. ORIGINS OF THE PROBLEM:
GREGORY V. HELVERING AND THE "BAIL-OUT"

When the corporate division complies with the provisions of Section
355,11 there is a deferral of recognition of gain or loss on the transaction.
The underlying assumption of the tax-free exchange provisions is presented
in the Regulations. It is that "the new property is substantially a continuation of the old investment still unliquidated; and, in the case of reorganizations, that the new enterprise, the new corporate structure, and the new
property are substantially continuations of the old still unliquidated."' 2
The elaborate provisions of Section 355 and the judicial business
purpose doctrine are safeguards to prevent the use of the corporate division
to effect what is known as a bail-out.
The best known example of a bail-out and by far the leading case in
this area, is Gregory v. Helvering." This case was decided under statutory
language which provided that a reorganization occurred when a corporation
transferred all or part of its assets to another corporation and immediately
after the transfer, the transferor corporation or its stockholders or both were
in control of the corporation to which the assets were transferred. The
statute went on to provide that if in pursuance of a plan of reorganization
9 Rev. Rul. 56-451, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 208; Rev. Rul. 56-366, 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 184.
10 Rev. Rul. 75-406, 1975-2 CUM. BULL. 125.
11 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 355. All subsequent references to sections will be to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 unless otherwise noted.
12
Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(c).
18 293
U.S. 465 (1935) [hereinafter
cited as Gregory].
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1978
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there were distributed stock or securities in a corporation which was a party
to the reorganization, to a shareholder without the surrender by such shareholder of stock or securities in such a corporation, no gain to the shareholder
from the receipt of the stock or securities would be recognized. 1"'
This language gave a sweeping tax exemption to the spin-off and opened
the way for tax evasion. According to the letter of the statute, it was possible
to transfer cash or liquid assets such as stock or securities to a new corporation and distribute the shares of the new corporation. The shareholders could
then liquidate the new corporation and be taxed on the difference between
the value of the assets received in the liquidation and the allocated basis of
the stock at capital gains rates, thus avoiding the tax on dividend income.'
It was just this scheme that Evelyn Gregory utilized. Mrs. Gregory owned
all of the stock of the United Mortgage Corporation which had among its
assets 1,000 shares of Monitor Securities Corporation. Mrs. Gregory had a
buyer for the Monitor stock, but she did not want to receive the Monitor
stock as a dividend. On September 18, 1928 the Averill Corporation was
organized. On September 20 the United Mortgage Corporation transferred
to Averill the 1,000 shares of Monitor stock in consideration for which the
Averill Corporation issued its shares to Mrs. Gregory. On September 24
Averill liquidated and dissolved after a life of six days, and Mrs. Gregory
sold the shares of Monitor.
The Board of Tax Appeals held for the taxpayer, saying, "A statute
so meticulously drafted must be interpreted as a literal expression of the
taxing policy, and leaves only the small interstices for judicial consideration.
The general legislative plan apparently was to recognize the corporate
entity and, in view of such recognition, to specify when the gains or losses
would be recognized and upon what basis they should be measured. We
may not destroy the effectiveness of this statutory plan by denying recognition
to the corporation and thus preventing consideration of its transactions.""6
The taxpayer lost in the Second Circuit. The Supreme Court affirmed
that decision and stated:
When subdivision (B) speaks of a transfer of assets by one corporation
to another, it means a transfer made "in pursuance of a plan of reorganization" . .. of corporate business; and not a transfer of assets by one
corporation to another in pursuance of a plan having no relation to the
business of either, as plainly is the case here. Putting aside, then, the
question of motive in respect of taxation altogether, and fixing the
character of the proceeding by what actually occurred, what do we
4 INT. REV. CODE of 1924, § 203(c).
15 See generally 3 MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

i627 B.T.A. 223, 225 (1932).
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol11/iss2/3
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find? Simply an operation having no business or corporate purpose-a
mere device which put on the form of a corporate reorganization as
a disguise for concealing its real character, and the sole object and
accomplishment of which was the consummation of a preconceived
plan, not to reorganize a business, but to transfer a parcel of corporate
shares to the petitioner. No doubt, a new and valid corporation was
created. But that corporation was nothing more than a contrivance
to the end last described. It was brought into existence for no other
purpose; it performed, as it was intended from the beginning it should
perform, no other function. When that limited function had been exercised, it immediately was put to death.
In these circumstances, the facts speak for themselves and are
susceptible of but one interpretation. The whole undertaking, though
conducted according to the terms of subdivision (B), was in fact an
elaborate and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate
reorganization, and nothing else. The rule which excludes from consideration the motive of tax avoidance is not pertinent to the situation,
because the transaction upon its face lies outside the plain intent of the
statute. To hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice above reality and
to deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious purpose."
Mrs. Gregory's victory before the Board of Tax Appeals was noted
with alarm by the Congress. In its report of December 4, 1933, the House
Ways and Means Subcommittee discussed the Gregory case and recommended a repeal of the provisions on which it relied.' The report of the
Ways and Means Committee rejected a complete elimination of the reorganization provisions, but did recommend that the spin-off provision be
eliminated. "This paragraph provides that a corporation by means of a
reorganization may distribute to its shareholders stock or securities in
another corporation, a party to the reorganization, without any tax to the
shareholders."' 9 This recommendation was adopted by the Congress in the
Revenue Act of 1934 despite the fact that the Court of Appeals' reversal
came down during the deliberations."0
It is interesting to note that although the 1934 Act removed the basis
of Mrs. Gregory's scheme, the reformers failed to take action on either the
split-off or the split-up. If a split-off included a pro-rata surrender of stock,
it could be used for the distribution of assets in the same manner as the
spin-off was used in Gregory. Even the split-up could be pressed into service
17

Gregory, supra note 13, at 469-70.

18H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933).
19 Id.

20 Apparently the decision was not noted by Congress. See Whitman, Draining the Serbonian
Bog: A New Approach to Corporate Separations Under the 1954 Code, 81 HRv.L. REv.

1194by (1967)
[hereinafter cited
Published
IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1978 as Whitman].
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as a means of distribution of assets. A corporation could transfer its business
assets to one corporation and its liquid assets to another and then distribute
the stock of both corporations in complete liquidation. In this manner, the
shareholders could carry on the business of the old corporation through one
of the new corporations and liquidate the other new corporation to get the
assets.21
The spin-off provisions were to remain absent from the law until 1951
when they were reinstated as Section 317 of the Revenue Act of 1951.
A. The "Device" Language in Gregory
It is important at this point to consider the origin of the "device" language in the Code and what, if any, relation exists between that language
and the business purpose doctrine which was developed in the Gregory case.
The origin of both terms, device and business purpose, was in the same
sentence in Gregory: "simply an operation having no business or corporate
purpose-a mere device which put on the form of a corporate reorganization
as a disguise for concealing its real character."2 2 Although in the opinion in
Gregory it is likely that the terms were used interchangeably, the question
remains whether the legislative use of the "device" language was intended
as a codification of the business purpose test or whether the legislature intended to introduce a completely new concept into the area of corporate
divisions.
Sometime after the end of World War II, taxpayer groups began to
lobby for the restoration of tax exempt spin-offs, giving as reasons the fact
that split-ups accomplished the same things in a more complex manner and
that Congress should encourage the voluntary division of corporate businesses
into smaller units. 3 In 1947 the Special Tax Study Committee reported to
the House Committee on Ways and Means, recommending that Section
112(g) (the spin-off provision) be reenacted. The report indicated considerable hostility to judicial innovations in the area, saying:
In the past 15 years, the Supreme Court and lower courts have undertaken through interpretation to add by judicial fiat a number of requirements to this part of the law. In a number of cases, it is quite
clear that the Congress did not intend to enact any such qualifications,
but rather intended the statutory language to be literally applied ....
It has been suggested that the split-up may have been left alone on the assumption that
the possible loss of franchises, contracts, and confusion of customers that would attend
a liquidation of the original corporation would discourage its use as a substitute for ordinary
21

dividends. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS § 13.02 (3d ed. 1971)
22 Gregory, supra note 13, at 469-70.
23

[hereinafter cited as

Whitman, supra note 20, at 1202.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol11/iss2/3

BITTKER].

6

Rigsby: The Business Purpose Doctrine

Fall, 19771

THE BUSINESS PURPOSE DOCTRINE

Indeed, if courts are to be free to insert additional requirements, no
one can undertake a reorganization with assurance, since he cannot
know in advance what the judicial requirements will be."
The "device" language first appeared in legislative form in the Revenue
Bill of 1948,5 and the accompanying report provides some insight into the
meaning intended by the draftsmen."6 In the committee report, an example
of a spin-off was given with facts substantially identical to those in the
Gregory case. The report went on to state that this sort of spin-off would
be allowed tax-free where business reasons existed, unrelated to any desire
to make a distribution of earnings and profits to the shareholders for the
separation of the assets. The report further stated that "[t]his Section has
been included in the bill because your committee believes that it is economically unsound to impede reorganizations which break up businesses
into a greater number of enterprises, when undertaken for legitimate business
purposes." 7 The Section referred to by the Committee (number 128) included an active business requirement and a provision denying nonrecognition
of gain or loss where the reorganization was principally a device for the
distribution of earnings and profits. From the use of the "device" language
in the statute and the use of "business purpose" or "business reason" in the
explanation and example, it seems that the terms were used interchangeably.
This bill, however, was not acted upon by the Senate. In 1950, the
Senate Finance Committee again proposed the allowance of the spin-off
using the same device provision as the House." The accompanying report
of the Senate Finance Committee 9 did not provide any further enlightenment
on the use of the "device" language. This proposal passed the Senate, but
was eliminated in conference.
In 1951, there was again a proposal to revive the tax-free spin-off.
The Senate version which was ultimately adopted was the same as that
passed by the House in 1948, and the report of the Senate Finance Committee used the same example, tracing the facts of Gregory and the language
concerning business reason, business purpose, and device. The language of
the new section read as follows:
If there is distributed, in pursuance of a plan of reorganization, to a
shareholder of a corporation which is a party to the reorganization,
H.R. Doc. No. 523, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1948).
H.R. 6712, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., § 128 (1948).
26 H.R. REP. No. 2087, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1948).
27 Id.
2SH.R. 8920, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., § 207 (1950).
29 S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 64, at 80-8 1, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD.
NEWS 3053.
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1978
24
25
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stock (other than preferred stock) in another corporation which is a
party to the reorganization, without the surrender by such shareholder
of stock, no gain to the distributee from the receipt of such stock shall
be recognized unless it appears that (A) any corporation which is a
party to such reorganization was not intended to continue the active
conduct of a trade or business after such reorganization, or (B) the
corporation whose stock is distributed was used principally as a device
for the distribution of earnings and profits to the shareholders of any
party to the reorganization." °
The committee reports give some evidence that the draftsmen considered
"device" to be synonymous with "business purpose" and thus, may have
meant the "device" language as a codification of the business purpose doctrine, but this is certainly not conclusive. In any event, the new provisions
only applied to spin-offs, and it was not until 1954 that split-offs and split-ups
were included in the device restrictions.
It is apparent that when the 1954 Code was written, the draftsmen
abandoned any idea of providing a general legislative framework within
which the Internal Revenue Service and the courts could work to protect
the revenues, and instead provided a detailed set of requirements which apply
to all corporate divisions whether or not they satisfy the requirements for a
corporate reorganization in Section 368. The device language from the 1954
Act was carried into the 1954 Code without comment in the committee
3
reports. 1
The form of the present statute is to allow a tax-free corporate division
by means of a distribution to the shareholders of stock or securities in another corporation. Immediately before the distribution, the distributing corporation must control the corporation, the stock or securities of which are
being distributed.3" Further, the distributing corporation must distribute
either all of the stock and securities in the controlled corporation held by it
immediately before the distribution or an amount of stock in the controlled
corporation constituting control, and establish to the satisfaction of the
Treasury that the retention of stock or securities in the controlled corporation is not part of a plan having as one of its principal purposes the avoidance
of income tax."
There is also a requirement relating to active business. 3 ' Either the
1st Sess. 58 (1951).
31 S. REP. No. 1635, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d
30 S. REP. No. 737, 82d Cong.,

Sess. 39 (1954). The report of the House Committee on Ways and Means had suggested
a different set of proposals for corporate divisions including a stock taint. This idea was
abandoned in conference in favor of the Senate proposals. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4025.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol11/iss2/3
3'INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 355(a)(1)(A). Control is defined in § 368.
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distributing corporation and the controlled corporation must be engaged
immediately after the distribution in the active conduct of a trade or business
or, if immediately before the distribution, the assets of the distributing corporation consisted only of the stock or securities in two or more controlled
corporations, each of the controlled corporations must be engaged immediately after the distribution in the active conduct of a trade or business. The
rule concerning the active conduct of a trade or business is only satisfied if
the trade or business was actively conducted throughout the five year period
ending on the date of distribution. 5
The device restriction is incorporated by the requirement that "the
transaction was not used principally as a device for the distribution of the
earnings and profits of the distributing corporation or the controlled corporation or both (but the mere fact that subsequent to the distribution stock
or securities in one or more of such corporations are sold or exchanged by
all or some of the distributees (other than pursuant to an arrangement negotiated or agreed upon prior to such distribution) shall not be construed to
mean that the transaction was used principally as such a device.)" 6 These
provisions apply independently of the reorganization definitions in Section
368 and apply whether or not the distribution is pro rata with respect to all
of the shareholders of the distributing corporation." '
These highly detailed and technical requirements, in order to enjoy a
tax-free corporate division, are the present legislative answer to Mrs. Gregory's scheme to bail out the stock held by her corporation. It is clear that
Congress, in drafting this section, did not trust the courts to apply judicial
doctrines to prevent the abuse of the spin-off provisions. What is not at all
clear is whether by the detail of the provisions in Section 355 and by the
inclusion of the device language, Congress intended to merely supplement the
judicial doctrine of business purpose or to replace it. Although there is
some evidence in the legislative history that Congress intended to codify the
business purpose doctrine by use of the device language, this is not certain
and presently the business purpose doctrine in all its forms co-exists with
the device language in Section 355.
At this point, it is interesting to consider some of the aspects of the
Gregory case and how they are covered by the present statute and judicial
doctrines. It is noteworthy that when the three principal weapons against
the bail-out are compared with the Gregory case, each would be sufficient
S31d. § 355(a)(1)(D).
341d. § 355(b)(1).
S15d. § 355(b)(2).
Sid. § 355(a)(1)(B).
Published
by§IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1978
371d.
355(a) (2).
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in itself to prevent Mrs. Gregory's scheme from working. The Averill Corporation, the subsidiary created to receive the 1,000 shares of Monitor Corporation stock, had never engaged in any business and was never intended
to. The active business requirement of Section 355 would not be satisfied
on this showing. The immediate and prearranged sale of the Monitor stock
would fall within the present interpretation of the device clause and thus,
the bail-out would again be prevented. Further, in the initial proceedings in
the Gregory case, it was apparently conceded that the organization of the
Averill Corporation was for no purpose other than the avoidance of tax."
The business purpose doctrine would be used to counteract the effort of
those taxpayers whose primary motive was the avoidance of tax.
As is readily apparent from this brief comparison of the legislative and
judicial weapons with the targets presented in Gregory, the approach to
ending bail-outs by Congress, the courts, and the Internal Revenue Service
has become excessively fragmented. This specialization of tests has helped
create a situation where apparent bail-outs are sometimes allowed tax-free and
where legitimate divisions are condemned as bail-outs.
Although the intricacies of the present form of the active business test
are beyond the scope of this discussion, it is important to realize that the
test does not always function so as to prevent the separation of liquid assets
from a corporation. 9 Even though it does function to prevent the separation
into a corporate shell of cash or securities alone, a corporate entity may be
created which carries on some attributes of a business which at the same
time drains off highly salable assets from the parent for eventual liquidation.
In addition, there is some evidence of a trend to downgrade the active business test in favor of a strengthened device test. The First Circuit in Rafferty
v. Commissioner"° has made the active business test an inquiry into whether
a corporation engages in "entrepreneurial endeavors of such a nature and
to such an extent as to qualitatively distinguish its operations from mere
investments." Given this state of affairs, it is the purpose here to examine
in detail the relationship and functioning of the two remaining barriers
against the bail-out of earnings and profits: the legislative device test and
the judicial business purpose test.
II. THE PROBLEM SINCE 1954: SECTION 355
A. The LegislativeDevice Test
Section 355 requires that in order for a distribution of stock or secur3s 27 B.T.A. 223, 225 (1933).
39
See, e.g., Hanson v. United States, 29 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 72-514 (D. Mont. 1971). See
also Whitman, supra note 20, wherein the author criticized the active business test as
essentially unworkable.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol11/iss2/3
40452 F.2d 767 (1st Cir. 1971).
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ities in a corporate division to be tax-free, the transaction must not have
been used principally as a device for the distribution of the earnings and
profits of the distributing corporation or the controlled corporation or both.
The statute also provides that except pursuant to an arrangement negotiated
or agreed upon prior to the distribution, the mere fact that subsequent to
the distribution, stock or securities in one or more of such corporations are
sold or exchanged by all or some of the distributees, shall not be construed
to mean that the transaction was used principally as such a device.
The Regulations construe the language in the statute on post distribution sales as narrowly as possible. "1 They provide that if pursuant to an
arrangement negotiated or agreed upon prior to the distribution of stock or
securities of the controlled corporation, part or all of the stock or securities
of either corporation is sold or exchanged after the distribution, the sale or
exchange will be evidence that the transaction was used principally as a
device. If a sale of stock or securities is made after the distribution and is
not pursuant to an arrangement, this fact will not be determinative that the
transaction was a device, but it will be evidence of a device. The effect of
these Regulations is that any post distribution sale of stock will be suspect.
However, in an effort to strengthen even further the restrictions on post
distribution sales, the Regulations state that if the rules respecting continuity
of interest are not met, Section 355 will not apply."
The Regulations further state that continuity of interest consists of two
parts: continuity of the entire business enterprise under modified corporate
forms and a continuity of interest in all or part of those persons who, directly
or indirectly, were the owners of the enterprise prior to the distribution or
exchange.'" The logic of this requirement of continuity of interest on part of
the owners is certainly open to question. The statute clearly contemplates
that at least some sales which are not prearranged will be allowed. Continuity
of interest as put forth in the Regulations would not allow any post distribution sales.
In an early revenue ruling," the Service was faced with a situation
where the shareholders of a corporation wanted to sell their corporation,
but the prospective purchaser was not interested in acquiring all the assets.
In order to make the corporation salable, it was proposed to distribute the
stock of the unwanted subsidiary. The Service ruled against the stockholders,
equating the device restrictions with continuity of interest in the following
language: "The purpose of the requirement that the transaction not be used
41

Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b).

42

Id. § 1.355-2(b)(1).

43

Id. § 1.355-2(c).
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principally as a device for the distribution of earnings and profits is to
limit the application of Section 355 of such code to those cases in which the
distribution of stock of the controlled corporation effects only a readjustment
of continuing interests in property under modified corporate forms.""9 In
this ruling, the Service seems to equate the continuity of interest doctrine
with the limitation on post distribution sales.
In a 1958 revenue ruling,48 the Service again equated continuity of
interest with post distribution sales. The ruling involved the distribution of
the stock of a subsidiary followed by the merger of the subsidiary with
another corporation. The fact that the Service found a device under these
circumstances seems unusual since all three companies involved were owned
by a taxpayer or a taxpayer and his wife. However, by 1959, the Service
had retreated from this extreme position. In a ruling issued that year," it was
held that the sale of stock immediately before the transaction in order to
allow a buyer to participate had the same effect as a contract to sell immediately after the transaction. Despite this holding, where the sale was made to
allow a key employee to buy an eighteen percent stock interest, no device
was found.
One question which has arisen is whether a spin-off followed by a
tax-free reorganization violates the device clause because a sale or exchange
has taken place. This situation frequently arises when two corporations wish
to effect a merger, but the acquiring corporation does not wish to acquire
all the assets of the other corporation. It does not seem that a spin-off
followed by a merger of the parent corporation without more is a distribution of earnings and profits. The assets of the former parent corporation
are now locked into the merged corporation and the assets of the spin-off
are also in a corporation. The spin-off and merger combination does not
lend itself more readily to a bail-out than does any spin-off. The circuits
have been in conflict on this question, " but the Service has indicated that
it will allow a contemporaneous merger and spin-off where there was otherwise no indication of a device. "9
In 1972, the Internal Revenue Service extended its rulings in this area
to allow a spin-off from the acquiring company in a merger in order to allow
the stockholders of the acquired company to receive a larger percentage of
45

Id.at 32.

46

Rev. Rul. 58-68, 1958-1 Curm. BuLL. 183.

47 Rev. Rul. 59-197, 1959-1 CuM. BuLL. 77.
48

See Morris Trust v. Commissioner, 18 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 5843 (4th Cir. 1966); Curtis
v. United States, 14 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 5685 (6th Cir. 1964).
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stock of the acquiring corporation."0 In a recent ruling, the Service approved
a spin-off of an existing subsidiary prior to a merger of that subsidiary into
another corporation."
There is a further aspect of the device clause which should be considered at this time. The Service has made it clear that it considers the device
clause as a test for dividend equivalency.52 That is, a device consists of the
conversion of dividend income into capital gains. 5
The Service has determined that if in the absence of Section 355,
another provision would be available to render the transaction taxable at
capital gains rates, there is no device since there is no conversion of ordinary
income into capital gains. Therefore, even if there is a post distribution sale,
if it can be shown that in the absence of Section 355 there would be capital
gains treatment for the stock received in the spin-off, there is no device.
In Revenue Ruling 64-102," the Service faced a situation where the
shareholders of a parent corporation with a wholly owned subsidiary had
divided the management of the corporations between two groups. Approximately one third of the shareholders were engaged in managing the subsidiary.
A conflict in management policy arose between the two groups, and it was
decided to spin off the subsidiary to the shareholders of the parent who had
been managing the subsidiary. In order to equalize the value of the stock
given up by the minority with that received by them, the parent made a
capital contribution to the subsidiary. The Service, on examination, found
that there was no device for the distribution of earnings and profits. In the
absence of Section 355, Section 302(b) (3)55 would be available to provide
for taxation at capital gains rates.
The Service distinguished Revenue Ruling 58-6856 involving a similar
capital contribution on the grounds that in the absence of Section 355, a
dividend might well be realized. In a 1971 ruling, the Service found no device
in a spin-off of a wholly owned subsidiary where immediately prior to the
spin-off there had been a substantial capital contribution to the subsidiary.
50 Rev. Rul. 72-530, 1972-2 CuM. BuLL. 212.
51 Rev. Rul. 75-406, 1975-2 CUM. BuLL. 125.
52

Rev. Rul. 71-384, 1971-2 CUM. BULL. 181.

53See Rev. Rul. 64-102, 1964-1 CUM. BULL. 136.
54/d.
55 INT. RPv. CODE of 1954, § 302 provides rules for stock redemptions. If the redemption falls
within any one of the safe harbors of Section 302(b), the shareholder is treated as having
sold or exchanged his stock. Section 302(b)(3) concerns a complete redemption of all of
the stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder.
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The Service reasoned that in the absence of Section 355, Section 302(b) (2)'
would be available.
This approach has been criticized on two separate grounds." First,
Congress did not intend to provide that stock redemptions were to escape
taxation altogether, but only that taxation was to be at the lower capital
gains rates. By the reasoning of the Internal Revenue Service, a transaction
which qualifies under Section 302(b) (3) as a complete redemption of a
shareholder's interest, if effected through a split-off which otherwise qualifies
under Section 355, will escape taxation entirely. Secondly, other than extending the Congressional grant of favorable tax treatment, when the reasoning of the Service is applied to Section 346,19 there is an even more surprising
result." The spin-off transaction that satisfies the active business rules of
both Sections 355 and 346 would be taxed at capital gains rates were it not
for the language of 355. This transaction would not, therefore, cause a
bail-out, and there would be no device. The result is that when a transaction
fits both sections, the device clause, which in the statute is given equal rank
with the active business rules, is completely eliminated.
A survey of this area of the law reveals the paucity of rulings and cases
directly concerned with the device clause. The narrow interpretation of the
potentially powerful device clause as a tool to combat only bail-outs which
occur by means of post distribution sales has weakened the overall approach
of Section 355. Certainly in this sense the device clause is not much of a
threat to those shareholders who would like to effect a bail-out of earnings
and profits. A subsidiary corporation can be formed and the assets ultimately
to be sold can be distributed to it in exchange for all its stock. The stock
of the subsidiary can then be distributed to the shareholders. The distribution will be claimed to be tax-free under Section 355, and it is here that the
Commissioner will usually step in and challenge. If there has been no sale,
then the device clause will not function even though every step but the last
to effect a bail-out has been consummated. After the seasoning of the assets
is accomplished, the bail-out can be finished without fear of the device
clause.
Device has remained little used primarily because the Commissioner
has chosen to rely on another weapon against bail-outs, the business purpose
test. As will shortly be developed in detail, this test has been used in much
the same spirit as Section 355. That is, it has been used to serve
57 This subsection

contains rules concerning substantially disproportionate redemptions of

stock.
Whitman, supra note 20, at 1239.
59 This section concerns distributions in partial liquidation.
58 See

60
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol11/iss2/3
Whitman, supra note 20, at 1239.
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a limited function, rather than as a focal point for an overall analysis
of the transaction in order to determine whether or not a bail-out has
occurred, or if not, whether the potential for a bail-out is so great that the
transaction should not escape taxation.
It is not readily apparent why this piecemeal approach to the problem
of preventing bail-outs has been used for so long. The approach is partly
inherent in Section 355 which was drafted in detail to provide a number
of specific statutory tests which must be satisfied. It is not clear, however,
why the Service and, with one exception, the courts have chosen to use
both device and business purpose as specific, narrow tests. The draftsmen's
approach to Section 355 may be due to a legislative mistrust of the ability
of the courts to fashion a remedy for the abuse of bail-outs which has lingered
since the Board of Tax Appeals held for Mrs. Gregory. It may also be
possible that the present approach to bail-outs by the Service and the courts
is due to the influence of the Gregory case. Certainly the taxpayer
would have lost under any one of the tests subsequently developed, i.e., active
business, business purpose, and device. Taxpayers and their advisors have
grown more subtle since the decision in Gregory, and today the system of
specific and narrow judicial and statutory requirements is not functioning
effectively.
Despite the narrow interpretation of device in the Regulations, the
Commissioner has indicated that it is entirely possible that the device test
will be used more broadly. The Regulations state that in determining whether
a transaction was used principally as a device for the distribution of the
earnings and profits of the distributing corporation or of the controlled corporation or both, consideration will be given to all of the facts and circumstances of the transaction. 1 In particular, consideration will be given to the
nature, kind, and amount of the assets of both corporations immediately
after the transaction. The fact that at the time of the transaction substantially
all of the assets of each of the corporations involved are and have been used
in the active conduct of trades or businesses which meet the requirements
of Section 355(b) will be considered evidence that the transaction was not
used principally as such a device.
B. JudicialBusiness Purpose Test
The judicial requirement that a corporate division have a business purpose arose from language in the Supreme Court's opinion in Gregory.6" The
draftsmen of Section 355 may have attempted to codify the requirement
by the device clause, but it has continued as a separate test. The Commissioner
61 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(3).

62 Gregory,
supra note 13, at
467.
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has included it in the Regulations, and it has been a frequent basis for decision
in the courts. The Regulations state that the "distribution by a corporation of
stock or securities of a controlled corporation to its shareholders with respect
to its own stock or to its security holders in exchange for its own securities
will not qualify under Section 355 where carried out for purposes not germane
to the business of the corporations. ' 3
The business purpose doctrine has, since its inception in the Gregory
case, encompassed several different approaches to the problem of the examination of motive in corporate divisions where a bail-out is suspected. In the
Supreme Court's opinion in Gregory, the rule which excludes from consideration the motive of tax avoidance was held not to be pertinent to the situation
because the transaction on its face was outside the plain intent of the statute."
Although the use of motive to determine whether or not a transaction is in
fact a bail-out has proven extraordinarily difficult, and the cases and rulings
are in a state of confusion, it is possible to distinguish three approaches to the
problem which have been used with some frequency.
The first approach attempts to distinguish between corporate and shareholder motives for a transaction. If the motive is found to be corporate, then
the transaction is not a bail-out. On the other hand, if the motive is one which
the court determines to be a shareholder motive, the presence of a bail-out
is indicated. The second of these is a definitional approach, wherein the
courts have attempted to enumerate or define affirmative business purposes
which if they can be shown to be the driving force behind the transaction,
probably indicate the absence of a bail-out. The third approach has been
named by one commentator65 as the step-business purpose doctrine. This
approach is used where the alleged reason for the transaction is sufficient
to justify the creation of a subsidiary corporation, but does not justify the
second step of a distribution of stock.
1. Corporate and Shareholder Motives
Perhaps the most interesting place to begin the consideration of the
business purpose doctrine is with the distinction between corporate and shareholder business purpose. While no such distinction was explicitly drawn by
the Supreme Court in Gregory, there is language suggestive of the difference
between a business or corporate purpose and the purpose of Mrs. Gregory,
the shareholder. "Putting aside, then, the question of motive in respect of
taxation altogether, and fixing the character of the proceeding by what
actually occurred, what do we find? Simply an operation having no business
63

Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c).
Gregory, supra note 13, at 468.
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or corporate purpose . . . the sole object and accomplishment of which was
the consummation of a preconceived plan, not to reorganize a business or
any part of a business, but to transfer a parcel of corporate shares to the
''6
petitioner.
The Service has not always been consistent in requiring the distinction
between corporate and shareholder purposes. Although the Regulations speak
in terms of purposes "germane to the business of the corporation" and separaby business exigencies,"67 early Service rulings ignored the
tions "required
distinction."s
The difficulty which can arise from the use of this particular distinction
is illustrated by the case of Perry E. Bondy. 9 The taxpayer was the sole
stockholder of Market Motors, Inc. which was engaged in carrying on the
business of a Ford automobile dealership. The corporation owned the real
estate on which the dealership was located which included an unusually
large building. The Ford Motor Company considered the building impractical
and a threat to the success of the franchise and began to pressure for the
removal of the building from the assets of Market Motors. In 1950, Bondy
Real Estate, Inc. was formed, and the building was transferred to it in return
for all its stock. In 1952, taxpayer's wife filed suit for divorce. As part of her
demand for alimony, she wanted a pledge of taxpayer's stock in Market
Motors. In order to partially satisfy this demand and at the same time protect
the franchise, another corporation, P.E.B., Inc., was formed, and the stock
of Bondy Real Estate was transferred to it in exchange for all its stock which
was distributed to petitioner. Three-fifths of this stock was placed in escrow,
in accordance with the separation agreement between taxpayer and his wife.
Despite the formation of Bondy Real Estate in 1950, the Ford Motor
representative had been pressing (since that time) for a more complete
alienation of the building. The question for decision was whether or not the
distribution of P.E.B. stock was tax-free under Section 355. Both the Tax
Court and the Fourth Circuit decided the case on the basis of whether the
principal motive for the distribution was personal, or was germane to the
business of the corporation. The Tax Court, downgrading the insistence of
Ford for further alienation, found that the purpose for the spin-off was personal and that Section 355 was not available. The Fourth Circuit, however,
Gregory, supra note 13, at 467.
Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(e).
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 57-464, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 244. Here, a corporation, engaged in the
manufacture of heating equipment, also owned an old warehouse used for storage and various
residential properties. The corporation spun-off the rental properties. There was no attempt
by the Service to distinguish corporate and shareholder motives, but rather the transaction
was disallowed on active business grounds.
69 30
T.C. 1037 (1958).
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weighed the factors differently and found that the principal purpose was the
preservation of the dealership."0 The differing results, depending on which
motive is considered predominant, points out the weakness of this type of
analysis. Moreover, there was virtually no chance that this transaction was
the vehicle for a bail-out. The majority of the real estate stock was entangled
in the settlement with Bondy's wife, and he could not sell it. Here, the
distinction between corporate and shareholder business purpose merely served
to confuse the issue. Analysis of probable motives in a transaction suspected
of being a bail-out is not helpful until it has first been determined that a
bail-out is possible.
In 1960, the Tax Court decided the case of Moses L. Parshelsky."' The
decision, rendered under the 1951 Act, is important since on appeal the
reasoning of the Bondy court was rejected. Parshelsky was the sole stockholder of a corporation engaged in the operation of a wholesale lumber and
millwork business. The corporation owned valuable real estate on which the
business was conducted. In addition, the corporation had a large earned
surplus and for some years had been paying a tax for an unreasonable accumulation of earnings. Parshelsky was of advanced age and was concerned
about the disposition of the business after his death. It was his wish that the
actual business be continued by a favored group of employees, but that the
land and building go to different beneficiaries. To this end, Parshelsky
caused the creation of a subsidiary corporation to which was transferred the
real estate in exchange for all its stock which was then distributed to Parshelsky. The subsidiary corporation leased back the real estate to its parent for
$42,000 per year for five years with an option to renew for five years.
The Service attacked the distribution of stock to Parshelsky, relying
principally on the corporate/shareholder distinction. The Tax Court agreed
and found no corporate business purpose for the reorganization. The Second
Circuit decisively rejected this distinction." The court said that since most
spin-offs occurred in the context of a closely held corporation, the distinction
between corporate and shareholder business purpose was purely formalistic.
Certainly here, in the case of a corporation with only one shareholder,
the only purposes which could exist were those of Moses Parshelsky. The
court, however, then focused its attention on whether there was a business
purpose for the transaction, either corporate or shareholder. The shareholder
purpose to facilitate estate planning was held, on remand, to bring the spinoff within the area of favorable tax treatment. However, as in Bondy, focus
T0 Bondy

v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1959).
34 T.C. 946 (1960).
72 Parshelsky v. Commissioner, 9 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 1382 (1962). The First Circuit had
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol11/iss2/3
rejected the distinction earlier in Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1949).
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on motive alone clouded the issue of whether or not a bail-out had in fact
occurred or had a large potential for occurring. Parshelsky managed to spin
off valuable and salable real estate. By providing for a long term lease,
Parshelsky insured that the original business would not be impaired in the
event of a sale of the spun-off corporation, and the high rental 73 provided a
means to drain further earnings from the original corporation.
One commentator writing in 1968 stated that Parshelsky had killed
off the no shareholder purpose fiction,7 ' but unfortunately, there are some
indications that this happy pronouncement was premature. In a 1965 decision,
the Ninth Circuit, although citing Parshelsky, indicated that a spin-off, the
purpose of which was to satisfy the personal needs of the shareholders, would
not have a business reason which would entitle the shareholders to a treatment
different from that of shareholders who receive dividends.7 5 The Internal
Revenue Service has also continued to rely on this aspect of the business
purpose doctrine.
The first indications that the Service would resist Parshelsky came in
Revenue Ruling 69-460." This ruling was given in response to a general
inquiry concerning the application of the business purpose requirement. The
ruling amplified the Regulations which require a business purpose germane
to the business of the corporations. "This provision makes it clear that Section
355 of the Code applies only to certain specified distributions or exchanges
of the stock or securities of controlled corporations incident to the readjustment of continuing interests in property under modified corporate forms.""'
A further indication of the Service's continuing emphasis on the shareholder/corporate purpose distinction is found in the first example given in
the ruling. The situation involved two equal shareholders who had become
antagonists and who wished to divide the corporation into equal parts. The
example indicated, however, that a mere dispute at the shareholder level is
not enough to justify the division. The example involves the situation where
"serious disputes... as to expansion, marketing channels, and discount policy
have created a situation where the parties are so antagonistic that the normal
operations of the business are seriously affected" and further provides that
"the non pro rata distribution was undertaken for reasons germane to corporate business problems and was necessary for the future conduct of the
Indeed, the Tax Court found that in the years 1953 and 1954, the original corporation
had not made enough after tax profit to even pay for the rent. Moses L. Parshelsky, 34
73

T.C. 946, 949 (1960).
74Whitman, supra note 20, at 1244.
75 Commissioner
76

v. Wilson, 16 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 6030, 6033 (9th Cir. 1965).

Rev. Rul. 69-460, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 51. See generally Bales, The Business Purpose of
Corporate Separations, 56 VA. L. REv. 1242 (1970).
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business." 8 It seems apparent from this ruling that the shareholder/corporate
business purpose distinction is still viable.
The Service enforced its position in Revenue Ruling 72-530,"9 where it
considered a spin-off as a necessary preliminary to a merger of the parent
corporation to improve its competitive position. "The improvement of X's
position with its competitors in the warehouse business is germane to its
corporate business and the acquisition of Z will accomplish this purpose."" °
In a recent and important revenue ruling, the Service apparently regressed to the reasoning followed by both courts in the Bondy case. Revenue
Ruling 75-33781 presented the Service with a situation like Bondy, involving
an automobile dealership and a taxpayer with dual motives. Here, X Corporation operated an automobile dealership and Y Corporation, a wholly
owned subsidiary, was engaged in the business of renting automobiles. A, the
holder of the franchise and owner of 53% of the stock of X, was 70 years
old at the time. He had five daughters who owned in equal portions the remainder of the stock of X. Three daughters were actively employed in the
business of X. The manufacturer's franchise policy was such that to continue
the franchise after the death of the present holder, all stockholders of X
would have to be active in the business. To this end, the stock of Y was
distributed, three-fourths to the two inactive shareholders of X in exchange
for all of their stock, and the remainder to A in exchange for X stock of
equal value. The distribution to the inactive daughters furthered the plans
to continue the franchise. The distribution to A was made to increase the
percentage of ownership in X on the part of the active daughters and to
provide A with Y stock which he could leave to the inactive daughters.
The ordinary definition of a bail-out has been given to mean that
"earnings and profits have been drawn off without impairing the shareholder's residual equity interest in the corporation's earning power, growth
potential, or voting control. 82 None of the daughters at the end of the
transaction had stock in more than one corporation and as to them, there
was no bail-out potential. A had stock in both Y and X and if the Y stock
were salable, he might realize a bail-out of earnings and profits. However,
his percent of ownership was reduced and if he also relinquished his majority
position, he impaired his equity in X and could not effect a bail-out. The
Service concluded that this transaction did not serve as the basis for a bail-out
781d.
79 Rev. Rul. 72-530, 1972-2 CuM. BuLL. 212.
80 Id.

81 Rev. Rul. 75-337, 1975-2 Cum. BULL. 124.
82 BrrrKER, supra note 21, § 13.36.
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because the "distribution of Y stock is germane to the continuation of the X
business in the reasonably foreseeable future." 8 The problem was immediate
due to the advanced age of A and was directly related to the retention of a
franchise vital to the business of the distributing corporation. The primary
purpose did not involve a personal motive and did not have merely a conjectural effect on the business.
It is apparent from this ruling that despite the rejection of the corporate/
shareholder business purpose distinction in Parshelsky, the Service will continue to apply it in suitable cases." This ruling also illustrates the futility of
trying to detect bail-outs on the basis of motive. If analysis of the transaction
reveals that it is structured in such a way that no bail-out is possible, then
there is no reason to consider the subtle and confusing distinctions encountered in an analysis of motive.
2. Affirmative Business Purpose
The second aspect of the business purpose doctrine is a definitional
approach wherein the courts and the Service have sought proof of certain
affirmative business purposes which, if present, make a bail-out unlikely.
This has obscured analysis of the actual transaction and has been unsatisfactory both in allowing legitimate corporate divisions and in preventing
bail-outs.
A motive for corporate division approved by the Service in two early
rulings is the separation of unrelated business activities in order to allow
more efficient operation. In Revenue Ruling 56-451, s5 a corporation was
engaged in the business of publishing trade magazines. The division of the
corporation was made to separate the publication of a magazine on the metal
working industry from the publication of magazines on electronics. Another
revenue ruling allowed the spinoff of a bakery and creamery from a retail
grocery chain. 8 Although in neither of these rulings was a complete statement
of facts given, it seems unlikely that corporate divisions of this type would
lend themselves to bail-outs.
A series of rulings in 1956 concerns banks which have accumulated
various real estate holdings by reason of defaults on loans.8 ' In each case,
83

Rev. Rul. 75-337, 1975-2 CuM. BULL. 124.

84 Interestingly, the Service discusses Rafferty v. Commissioner, 28 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 716110 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922 (1972), which presents a different and
superior approach to the bail-out problem, and distinguishes it as a balancing of corporate
versus shareholder purposes in which the shareholder purpose predominated.
85 Rev. Rul. 56-451, 1956-2 CuM.BULL. 208.
SGRev. Rul. 56-266, 1956-1 CuM.BULL. 184.
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the bank spun off a subsidiary corporation which contained the highly liquid
assets and, in each case, the Service approved the spin-off, apparently finding
the desire to separate these assets from the bank to be a sufficient business
purpose. The potential for a bail-out is significant here because the assets
were highly liquid, and it seems unlikely that these rulings have any application outside the banking business. Apparently, the spin-offs were allowed
because of the specialized and highly regulated nature of the banking industry.
An affirmative business purpose which has met with approval both in
revenue rulings and in court decisions is that of dividing a corporation to
resolve shareholder differences. There is, however, some uncertainty as to
the degree of shareholder difference which will be required to support a
valid business purpose. In a 1956 ruling, the Service allowed a corporate
division where two equal shareholders, one of whom managed one corporate
business while the other managed another business, had "fundamental differences in policy.""s The Tax Court, in the case of Albert W. Badanes,89
allowed a corporate division where two businessmen could no longer agree
as to the proper means of conducting their joint business interests and where
there was continuous conflict over a period of years arising out of personality
differences and differing ideas regarding the corporation's management and
operations.
To this point, neither the Tax Court nor the Service had attempted to
define the degree of shareholder difference necessary, beyond the statement
that it must be a "fundamental" disagreement. In Revenue Ruling 69-460,
however, the Service indicated that the dispute must have "created a situation
where the parties are so antagonistic that the normal operations of the business are seriously affected."90 This requirement (which has already been
discussed in connection with the corporate/shareholder business purpose
distinction) seems to disallow a spin-off unless the business itself is suffering,
although there is no indication as to when normal business operations are
seriously affected.9 1
88 Rev.

Rul. 56-655, 1956-2 CuM. BULL: 214.

89 39 T.C. 410 (1962).
90 Rev. Rul. 69-460, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 51, 52.
91 It is apparent from this ruling that the requirement that the normal operations of the
business be affected before a shareholder dispute can satisfy the business purpose doctrine

will shift the analysis from bail-out potential to a close examination of the impact of the
shareholder dispute.
If shareholder interest in the success of the business can overcome these policy
differences or if one or more of the shareholders are out of control and are thus not
in a position to affect management, then sufficient business justification for separate
ownership would not exist.... If the tax burden arising from a stock redemption in
termination of interest is unacceptable, the quarreling shareholders of a corporation not
yet clearly damaged by their differences may be left with -two alternative courses to
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol11/iss2/3
follow. The shareholders could attempt to modify their existing corporate structure
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A business purpose which has been argued and approved several times
is that of pressure from customers. Frequently, it happens that a corporation
engages in two or more related businesses which are linked in a manufacturing, production, or service chain. In these corporations, it is also common
for each business to have customers apart from the other business of the
corporation. The customers may in fact be customers of one business and in
competition with the other corporate business, an arrangement which may
work to retard the growth of the corporation. Examples of situations where
customer demands have formed the basis for the business purpose requirement include a printing corporation, the wholly owned subsidiary of which
was a typesetting corporation,"2 and a corporation which engaged in both
a manufacturing and a brokerage business."
In a case decided by the Tax Court, H. Grady Lester, Jr.," a corporation
was engaged in business as a distributor of auto parts in a dual capacity as
a warehouse distributor and as a jobber."5 Since jobbers who bought from the
corporation objected to its dual activities, it was decided to spin off the
warehouse activities. The court found the business purpose doctrine satisfied." Although the original corporation had a large earned surplus, the
spin-off of the assets of the warehouse business did not lend itself to a bail-out.
Sale of such an important part of the original business would not constitute
removal of liquid assets from the business and would cause an impairment
of equity.
Another business purpose which is sometimes advanced is that a corporate division is required by law or has been ordered by a regulatory
authority. In Revenue Ruling 62-138," a banking corporation was found
to own all the stock of a realty company which had among its assets certain
residential apartment buildings. The banking regulatory authorities advised
short of separation, perhaps by creating autonomous branches, and the disputing shareholders could assent to elaborate contractual arrangements regulating management
authority, profit and loss allocation, liquidation rights and the like. However, these

efforts to minimize differences may be no more than stop-gap measures, merely precursors foreboding the certain corporate deteriorations that will guarantee the necessary
impact on the business for Section 355 qualification.... The other alternative would
be to separate the business in reliance upon Section 355 and await the Commissioner's
challenge.
Bales, The Business Purpose of Corporate Separations,56 VA. L. REV. 1242, 1260-61 (1970).
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who bought from the corporation objected to its dual practice.
06 Concern about possible violations of the Robinson-Patman Act also provided a motive
for the division. See Grady Lester, Jr., supra note 6.
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the bank to divest itself of these holdings, and this provided a business purpose for the corporate division. 8 A bank was also involved in a 1964 case9 '
where a state bank and a national bank planned to consolidate and, after
consolidation, to operate under the charter of the national bank. To comply
with federal law, it was necessary for the state bank to divest itself of its
insurance business which it chose to do by means of a spin-off in conjunction
with the consolidation. The Tax Court found this to be a valid business
purpose.
In at least one instance, labor difficulties provided a valid business
purpose for a corporate division. In the case of Sidney L. Olson, ° the parent
corporation was engaged in business in C!eveland, Ohio while its subsidiary
did a similar business in Buffalo, New York. The parent corporation had
experienced labor problems in the Cleveland store, and there had been an
attempt to unionize the employees of the store. There was a threat of the
spread of the labor difficulties to the store operated by the subsidiary and
to better isolate the stores, the subsidiaries' stock was distributed to the
parent.
In some corporations, more frequently in small ones, there are one or
two key employees whose services are essential to the success of the corporate
business. To induce such key employees to stay, it may be necessary to allow
the employees to purchase an interest in the corporation. In order to allow
the key employee to buy in, a corporate division may be required. Sometimes
the assets of the corporation are such that the value of the stock is too great
to allow the employee to buy a meaningful percentage, and a spin-off is
necessary to reduce the assets, or there may be more than one corporate
business and stockholders want the employee to have an interest in only one
business."'
A recent and interesting case in which the business purpose advanced
was to allow key employees to buy in is Hanson v. United States.' The old
corporation, H-M Corporation, had four stockholders and was engaged in
the retail sale of new and used cars. It also provided financing and owned
the real property on which its business operations were located. The new
company, Hanson-Mersen Motors, Inc., was incorporated December 30,
.18More recently, in Rev. Rul. 75-406, 1975-38 INT. REV. BULL. 7, the Service found no
device where X corporation, a publicly held corporation which had a wholly owned subsidiary, had to divest itself of the subsidiary pursuant to a government order. The Service

apparently only considered the possibility of a bail-out, because there were negotiations for
the merger of a subsidiary with a third corporation soon after the distribution of Y stock.
99 Mary Archer Morris Trust, 42 T.C. 769 (1964).
10048 T.C. 855 (1967).
101 See Rev. Rul. 69-460, 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 51.
102 29 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 72-514 (D. Mont. 1972).
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1954 and shortly thereafter, it exchanged its stock for the old company's
new car business, including its Ford Motor Company franchise. The stock
was distributed, and two employees purchased interests in the new company.
The old company liquidated its used car inventory, and thereafter continued
its existence as landlord of the new company. In addition, the old company,
although in competition with Ford and with local banks, provided some
financing for the new corporation. In the five years following the spin-off,
this financing operation varied between seven and eleven percent of the total
combined profit of the old and new corporations.
It was this activity which the court found to satisfy the active business
requirement of Section 355. The court found that two valid business purposes
were advanced: to provide a new franchise agreement with Ford and to
permit employees to buy an interest in the business. The court also found
that tax avoidance was not among the motives prompting the spin-off.
Despite these findings, the court listed the assets transferred to the new
company and those retained by the old company, a listing which presents a
vivid picture of a bail-out. The old corporation functioned only as landlord
and sometimes financing company to the new corporation, which had no
telephone or separate business address and which was not even held out to
third persons as a separate entity, nevertheless had very substantial assets.
It retained cash, notes and receivables, securities, inventory, land and
buildings representing a total investment in excess of $146,000, over
twice the value of the assets transferred to the new corporation.
Motive aside, the assets retained by the old corporation could easily
be disposed of without interruption to the business of the new corporation
with the exception of the land and building. It is quite possible that, however
necessary these were to the business, they could be easily replaced, leaving
the stockholders in a position to effect a bail-out at any moment. Even if the
court's conclusion that no tax avoidance motive existed' is accepted, it
may be questioned whether a transaction such as is presented here comes
within the overall rationale for the tax deferral sections.
In the general area of corporate reorganizations, the investment remains
in assets which are in corporate solution, although the form of the corporation
may change. Here, however, the old corporation has become a mere shell
and should not be recognized as an entity for tax purposes. When the investments have become so liquid and where the corporation containing them
functions only as an easily discarded appendage to another corporation, this

103 This

conclusion may be somewhat in question by reason of the court's footnote 22, where
Hanson was quoted as saying that the division was made so that it would "make it possible
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does not satisfy the rationale behind the reorganization provisions and regardless of motive, the transaction should be subject to taxation.
To return now to the consideration of business purposes acceptable
to the Service or to the courts, Revenue Ruling 72-5301 presented a situation where it was permissible to spin off a subsidiary in order to facilitate
a merger. X corporation, a warehousing business, desired to effect a merger
with Z corporation, another warehousing business, in order to strengthen the
competitive position of both firms. It was not practical to transfer the X and
Z warehousing businesses to a new corporation, because the new corporation
would have to apply for a new state warehousing license and to comply with
conditions applicable to new but not existing warehousing businesses. In
order to secure the agreement of Z shareholders to the merger, it was
necessary that they receive a one-half equity interest in X, which was not
possible unless X distributed the stock of its wholly owned subsidiary, Y.
Accordingly, this distribution met the business purpose requirement.
Finally, in two recent rulings,"0 5 the Service has allowed corporate
divisions in order to reduce state taxes and to increase the availability of
commercial loans.
In the cases which have been discussed, the existence of an acceptable
business purpose has not been explicitly stated to be in addition to and
separate from the lack of a device. However, in the Wilson case,106 the Ninth
Circuit so held in what has been called by one commentator a "sorry regression."' ° This case involved a corporation, wholly owned by two brothers,
which operated a furniture store business. The corporation sometimes sold
furniture on the basis of deferred payments, and as a result, had on hand
conditional sales contracts. A new corporation was formed, and in exchange
for its stock which was distributed to the brothers, the conditional sales contracts were transferred to it. The Tax Court adopted the unusual position
of requiring the taxpayers to assume the burden of proving that the transaction did not constitute a device.0 8 The reasons advanced by the taxpayers
as business purposes for the spin-off were rejected as insufficient to carry the
burden of proof. The Tax Court did, however, find that overall the taxpayers
had demonstrated that the transaction was not a device and found the burden
of proof satisfied.
The Ninth Circuit, misconstruing the Tax Court opinion, found itself
104

Rev. Rul. 72-530, 1972-2 CuM. BULL. 212.

105 Rev. Rul. 76-187, 1976-1 CUM. BULL. 97; Rev. Rul. 77-22, 1977-4 INT. REV. BULL. 7.

10G Commissioner v. Wilson, 16 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 6030 (9th Cir. 1965).
107 Whitman, supra note 20, at 1244.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol11/iss2/3
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confronted with a unique situation. Here was a case with no business purpose
for what had been done and yet no tax avoidance motive. The court concluded, however, "that even if there is no tax avoidance motive, a reorganization having no business reason does not result in the tax advantages which
Section 355 confers upon those who satisfy the legal requirements for its
benefits."1 9 This is a startling conclusion. The court found that even if there
is no device to distribute earnings and profits and all the requirements of
the statute are satisfied, there still must be fulfilled an additional judicially
imposed requirement before the statutory benefits are granted. If there is
no bail-out, as the absence of a device shows, there is no reason for the
addition of the business purpose test. Predictably, the Service has endorsed
the Wilson case and the requirement that there be a business purpose even
in the absence of a device. 1 '
3. Step-Business Purpose
The final thread running through the business purpose doctrine which
must be examined is that of the step-business purpose doctrine. This aspect
of business purpose is referred to as the "step" doctrine because the spin-off
transaction occurs in two stages or steps: first, a subsidiary is created and
assets are transferred to it in exchange for stock, and second, the stock is
distributed. Using the step-business purpose doctrine, the courts examine
a motive or business purpose advanced in support of a transaction to see
whether it can be satisfied by the creation of the subsidiary without necessitating a distribution of stock. If the business purpose can be satisfied by creation
of a subsidiary without the stock distribution, then there is no business purpose for the completed transaction, and the stock distribution is taxed as a
dividend. Of course, Section 355 allows distribution of the stock of an existing
subsidiary, and in this case, the step-business purpose doctrine will not
111
apply.
While this doctrine is clearly required now by Revenue Ruling 69460,112 the Service has not always been consistent in this regard. In Revenue
Ruling 56-2661" the taxpayers wanted to spin-off a bakery and creamery
from a retail grocery chain. The purpose for the spin-off was to separate
unrelated business activities in order to operate more efficiently. In allowing
the spin-off, the Service overlooked the fact that separation of the businesses
could have been accomplished equally well without the distribution of stock.
1o9 Supra note 75.
110 See Rev. Rul. 69-460, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 51.
111 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 355(2)(c).
112 Rev. Rul. 69-460, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 51.
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In Revenue Ruling 56-45 1,114 the Service again overlooked the same
distinction. This ruling involved the separation of components of a corporation which publishes trade magazines. One magazine concerned the metal
working industry, while the others were in the field of electronics. The purpose of separating the magazines was due to different problems in publishing,
to isolate the assets, and to secure high level management. In another 1956
ruling, although the Service did not use the step doctrine to disallow a
transaction, it did examine both the business purposes for the formation of
the new corporation and that for the distribution of the stock." 5
Although the cases and rulings applying this doctrine are few, the
Service indicated in Revenue Ruling 69-460 that it would continue to apply
the step doctrine. "The fact that there is a valid business reason for the
creation of a new corporation does not necessarily satisfy the business purpose requirement for the distribution of the stock pursuant to Section 355
of the Code.""'
Revenue Ruling 69-460 discusses two situations which although not
directly concerned with the step-business purpose doctrine, do have interesting implications for it. In the first situation," 7 X corporation is a closely held
corporation engaged in the manufacture of precision scientific equipment
and has a wholly owned subsidiary corporation, Y, engaged in the tool and
die business. To retain certain key employees of X, it is necessary to allow
them to buy an interest in X. This would be too expensive due to the inclusion
of the Y stock in the assets of X. X, therefore, proposed to distribute Y
stock to its shareholders who would then sell X stock to the key employees.
This distribution was found to have a valid business purpose.
In the second situation, X corporation was in the shoe business and
owned eighty-five percent of the stock of Y corporation which was engaged
in the sale of skiing equipment. A key employee of Y desired to buy an
interest in that corporation. X distributed its stock in Y to its shareholder.
Since the employee could have purchased a stock interest in Y directly from
X without the distribution of stock, there was a taxable distribution to the
stockholder of X.
Certainly, these situations are not without logic. It makes no sense in
the second situation to distribute stock simply in order to sell it, when it
could have been as easily sold from the corporation. The problem, however,
arises not where there is an existing subsidiary, but where there is a corpora'14 Rev. Rul. 56-451, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 208.
115 Rev. Rul. 56-557, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 199.
"16

Rev. Rul. 69-460, 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 51, 52.
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tion with two or more businesses which does not have a subsidiary. If an
employee wants to buy into one business, and either because it is too expensive to buy into the corporation or because the present owners do not
want the employee to have an interest in assets of both businesses, a spin-off
is desired, the form of that spin-off becomes very important. If a subsidiary
corporation is created and the assets of the business in which the employee
is not to invest are spun off, then the first situation discussed should make
this transaction valid. If, however, the assets of the business in which the
employee is to invest are spun off, then by the second situation discussed,
there would be no business purpose for the distribution.
It is always possible that the Service will assert that there can never
be a business purpose for a spin-off from an integrated corporation for the
purpose of allowing an employee to buy into one business, since that business
could always be put in a subsidiary and the employee could buy stock at
that stage. In Patricia W. Burke,'18 it was held that a spin-off from an integrated corporation in order to allow a key employee to buy in did have a
business purpose, but in light of Revenue Ruling 69-460, the issue had to
be regarded as not settled. This question has been considered by one court
since the ruling, and the position of the Service was clearly rejected.
In Hanson v. United States,"9 there was a spin-off, the purpose of which
was to allow certain employees to buy in to part of an integrated corporation.
The assets spun off were those in which the employees were to have an interest and thus, under the logic of Revenue Ruling 69-460, there was no
business purpose for the distribution, since stock in the subsidiary could
have been sold. The court rejected the argument of the Service, but in a
puzzling manner. The court first cited Parshelsky for the proposition that
the taxpayer must show a business purpose for both the formation of the
subsidiary and the distribution of its stock by the parent. The court then
said, "It does not follow that a spin-off, promoted by valid business motives,
can be taxed merely by showing that the same business purposes could have
been served by some other form of reorganization." 2 '
Apparently the court is rejecting the step-business purpose doctrine,
since the heart of that doctrine is that if the business purpose could be
satisfied by the initial step of the creation of a subsidiary, then absent some
other business purpose which compels the stock distribution, Section 355
does not apply. It also seems possible that although the court speaks of this
doctrine, the decision was actually based on the court's finding that there
11s 42 T.C. 1021 (1964).
119 29 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 72-514 (D. Mont. 1972).
120 1d.
at 72-522.
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was no device. In either event, the status of the step-business purpose doctrine
cannot be regarded as settled.
4. A Pragmatic View of the Various Approaches
As it has been interpreted and supplemented by both the courts and
the Service, Section 355 has not provided an adequate safeguard against
bail-out transactions. The overall problem seems to be that the major judicial
and statutory tests fashioned to stop the bail-out operate in a piecemeal
manner. This type of approach has been generally ineffective for two reasons.
First, because certain transactions, which may marginally satisfy each of the
tests, seem to provide the setting for a bail-out, and second, because the
individual tests are in such a state of confusion. This is particularly well
demonstrated by the business purpose doctrine. It is a foregone conclusion
that any doctrine which determines the tax effects of a transaction on the
basis of taxpayer motive will produce difficult cases, since motives are frequently mixed or unclear. Even acknowledging this difficulty, the various
aspects of the business purpose doctrine, as developed by the courts and the
Service, have proved unsatisfactory.
The distinction between a corporate purpose and a shareholder purpose
for a spin-off was, of course, an attempt to distinguish between motives
which lead to a bail-out and those which do not. However, as was pointed
out in Parshelsky, the bail-out most often occurs in the context of a closelyheld corporation. When the number of shareholders becomes small, the
entity theory of a corporation is no longer valid. The dividend policy, officers'
salaries, and general management policies may be affected more by family and
personal needs than by business considerations. Because the distinction between corporate and shareholder motives in the context of a close corporation is so difficult to make, the effect of the business purpose doctrine is
to shift the attention of the court away from the inquiry concerning the
bail-out.
The affirmative business purpose doctrine has been more useful. Here,
the courts have not so much tried to distinguish permissible from impermissible motives by means of a test, as they have tried to define and list motives
which will satisfy the business purpose test. Some of these purposes, when
they are truly the force behind the corporate division, almost certainly indicate
the lack of a bail-out. Examples of such motives include corporate divisions
to satisfy legal requirements or to end problems caused by feuding shareholders. This aspect of the business purpose doctrine has several flaws of
its own that arise from the fact that the courts are trying to define a range
of permissible motives for divisive reorganizations. This creates a problem
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol11/iss2/3
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Further, in deciding which criteria fit the definition of business purpose
without considering which motives lead to a bail-out, the courts in effect
substitute their business judgment for that of the taxpayer.
A second problem with this aspect of the business purpose doctrine is
that it obscures analysis of a bail-out by looking at reasons for what was
done rather than what in fact happened. This allows transactions to occur
where the potential for bail-out was very high, although the motive falls
within acceptable business purposes. An example of this result is the Hanson
case discussed earlier.
Finally, this definitional approach to the business purpose doctrine
tends to shift the emphasis of Section 355. The statutory provision is written
in terms of allowing tax-free treatment of any transaction which satisfies its
various tests. Business purpose in general and particularly this aspect of the
doctrine, narrows the range of allowable transactions contemplated by the
statute, and unfortunately, it does this in a manner which does not guarantee
an absence of bail-out.
The step-business puropse doctrine represents an attempt to determine
whether a motive advanced by the taxpayer is sufficient to justify both the
creation of the subsidiary and the distribution of its stock. If only the creation
of the subsidiary is supported, the distribution of stock is held to be part
of a bail-out. In the first place, the fact that a motive could be satisfied by
the mere creation of a subsidiary does not prove the presence or absence of
a ball-out. Further analysis of the transaction itself is necessary to determine
what has in fact occurred. In addition, this doctrine leads to the complexities
and technicalities discussed in connection with Revenue Ruling 69-460.
IV. A NEW APPROACH TO PREVENT BAIL-OUTS:
RAFFERTY V. COMMISSIONER

It is important to consider in some detail a recent case in which the
First Circuit used a different approach to the problem of preventing bail-outs.
In Rafferty v. Commissioner,"' the taxpayers owned all the stock of the
Rafferty Brown Steel Co. (RBS), a Massachusetts corporation engaged in
the processing and distribution of steel. In 1960, Teragram Realty Co. was
organized, and the real estate on which RBS engaged in business was transferred to it in exchange for all its stock. The real estate was then leased
back to RBS for ten years at an annual rental of $42,000. In 1962, taxpayers organized Rafferty Brown Steel Co. of Connecticut (RBS Conn.).
After three years, Teragram purchased some unimproved real estate and
built a plant which it leased to RBS Conn. for fourteen years. In 1965, RBS
Published
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had an earned surplus of over $500,000, while Teragram had an earned surplus of $46,743. In 1965, the Teragram stock was distributed to taxpayers.
The reason advanced for the distribution was in order to provide for
the estate planning of Joseph Rafferty. It was his wish that his sons join
him in the active management of the steel business and that his daughters
would be provided with property which would produce a steady income.
The taxpayers planned to use the Teragram stock for future gifts to the
daughters.
The analysis of the court involved three parts. First, the court considered how easily the taxpayer would be able, were he so to choose, to
liquidate or sell the spun-off corporation. The court said that the question
here was "whether the property transferred to the newly organized corporation had a readily realizable value, so that the distributee-shareholders could,
if they ever wished, 'obtain such cash or property or the cash equivalent
thereof either by selling the distributed stock or liquidating the corporation,
thereby converting what would otherwise be dividends taxable as ordinary
income into capital gain.' "122
The second question in this analysis is whether the taxpayers could
effect a bail-out without impairing their control over the ongoing business.
The court quoted the definition of bail-out given by Bittker and Eustice as
the situation where "earnings and profits have been drawn off without impairing the shareholder's residual equity interest in the corporations' earning
power, growth potential, or voting control."' 23 The court did not further define
the impairment of equity test, although in the context of this case, the court
looked for evidence that the land and buildings at which RBS carried on
its steel operations were so distinctive that the sale of Teragram stock would
impair the continued operation of RBS or impair Rafferty's control or other
equity interests at RBS. This test, of course, refers to impaired equity in the
distributing corporation, since any sale will impair equity in the spun-off
corporation. One commentator has suggested that the court here implies
that the further question of whether the spun-off assets can be replaced,
must also be asked.'
Thirdly, the court's analysis ties the transactional analysis to an examination of taxpayer motive. It has been said that "in effect, under this approach a taxpayer is given another bite at the apple to show that the likelihood of a bail-out is slight."'2 5 The question considered by the court was
ld. at 71-6113.
BrrrKER, supra note 21, § 13.06.
124 Lee, Functional Divisions and Other Corporate Separations Under Section 355 after
Rafferty, 27 TAx L. REv. 453, 483 (1972).
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whether the taxpayers' desire to distribute the Teragram stock to facilitate
their estate planning was a sufficient personal business purpose to prevent
the transaction from being a device for the distribution of earnings and
profits. The court, however, held that merely any investment purpose of the
shareholders was not sufficient. Where a distribution has a considerable
potential for use as a device for distributing earnings and profits, it will not
qualify for tax-free treatment on the basis of personal motives unless these
motives are germane to the continuance of the corporate business.
It is interesting to note that the court does change the language in the
Regulations which require "purposes . . . germane to the business of the
corporations."' 28 It is possible that the court is trying to get away from the
confusion of the business purpose doctrine. However that may be, the language of motives germane to the continuance of the corporate business combined with the court's limitation of the Lewis case 2 to its facts seems to
indicate that the court may follow the corporate/shareholder business purpose distinction.
Although the court may be using this aspect of the business purpose
doctrine, it is certainly not following the requirement advanced by the Ninth
Circuit in Commissioner v. Wilson"18 that business purpose is an affirmative
requirement which must be satisfied even in the absence of a device. Here,
motive of the taxpayer is not considered at all unless the transaction has a
high potential for use as a bail-out. If it does, motives which prove that it
is unlikely that the distinction is being used as a device may be used to show
non-device. This is a vast improvement over the general use of the business
purpose doctrine. Certainly where the transaction has no potential for use
as a bail-out, it should be allowed regardless of motive, and the court has
no reason to become entangled in the intricacies of business purpose.
Although Rafferty did not involve a situation for the application of
the step-business purpose doctrine since there was an existing subsidiary,
the court did engage in the somewhat similar reasoning of dividend equivalence. The reasoning in the step doctrine is that if the alleged business purpose can be satisfied by the creation of a subsidiary corporation, then the
additional step of stock distribution must be for a tax avoidance reason.
126Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c).

2TLewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646 (Ist Cir. 1949). The court had said, "To seek to
differentiate between 'corporate purpose' and 'shareholder purpose' is unrealistic and impractical, particularly with respect to closely held corporations.... The separate legal entity
of these corporations should not obscure the fact that they are operated by their share-

holders in a manner thought best calculated to serve the latter's interests. What is deemed
best for the shareholders is deemed best for the corporation, and vice versa."
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In Rafferty, the court indicated that the business purpose could have been
satisfied by a dividend. A stock distribution would probably be deemed a tax
avoidance purpose and it would seem that the taxpayer would encounter
significant difficulty in overcoming his burden of showing non-device, especially in view of the high bail-out potential.
While Rafferty does not answer the questions as to exactly how the
business purpose doctrine survives, it is clear that the potential for reviving
or continuing much of the confusion in motivational analysis exists. It is
considerably downgraded to be sure, since the question does not even arise
unless the transaction has much potential for abuse.
Since the Rafferty decision, there has been a case and a revenue ruling
which give some indication of the influence of that decision. In King v.
Commissioner,"' the Sixth Circuit was concerned with a distribution of
stock of subsidiary corporations of Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc., a carrier
of freight in interstate commerce. Mason and Dixon had been expanding
rapidly since 1945, and after 1950, it was in need of new terminal facilities.
In order to borrow substantial funds without prior ICC approval, subsidiary
corporations were formed to acquire, improve, and lease real estate to
Mason and Dixon. In 1963, in order to facilitate a merger of Mason and
Dixon with another company, the stock of the subsidiary corporations was
distributed and then exchanged for stock in a holding company. The reason
for this exchange was that each of the three subsidiary corporations now
enjoyed greater borrowing power by virtue of the fact that the common parent
could negotiate for all.
The Tax Court decided the case on the basis of the active business
requirement and had not considered the device issue.' The Sixth Circuit
reversed and went on to consider the device issue. Although not supported
by the record, the court found that a sale of the terminal facilities could
not be easily arranged because the terminals were single purpose facilities
which required specialized equipment and construction. Further, the terminal
facilities could not be sold without impairing the continued operations of
Mason and Dixon. At this point, since there was no potential for a bail-out,
there was no reason to consider taxpayer motives under the Rafferty analysis.
The court did, however, discuss motive and found a corporate business
purpose for the distribution. "The motive for the distribution was to place
all non-carrier corporations in a single group, with a common parent in order
to accomplish the maximum concentration of financial strength with which
to raise additional capital to enable the subsidiaries to construct the terminals
129 29 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 72-869 (6th Cir. 1972).

,90 King v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 677 (1971).
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needed by Mason and Dixon. The purpose of all transactions was immediate
and germane to the continuation of all corporations. If any shareholder
purpose was served, it was a normal purpose in that the corporations in
which they owned interests were enabled to expand and to become more
profitable."''
It is apparent that the Sixth Circuit did not understand the reduced
role of business purpose under the Rafferty analysis. By examining motive
even in the face of its determination that there was no device, the court
seems to follow the requirement in Wilson that business purpose is a test
independent of device which must be satisfied in order to receive the benefits
of Section 355. In addition to using the two part Rafferty analysis to find
that this transaction had no bail-out potential, the court said that the distribution could not be a device because the plan of distribution required
that the stock received be exchanged immediately for the stock of the holding
company. Thus, it was felt that the distributed stocks were locked into the
holding company after the transaction, as securely as they had been locked
into Mason and Dixon. This overlooks the fact that the subsidiary stock
and thus, the real estate assets, were no longer locked into Mason and Dixon.
If they were salable, a bail-out was possible.
Although the Sixth Circuit has at least partially adopted the analysis of
Rafferty, the Commissioner has not indicated his willingness to do so as yet.
In Revenue Ruling 75-337,"' the question was whether the business purpose
requirement was satisfied in a distribution of stock of an existing subsidiary
to a majority shareholder and two inactive shareholders. The purpose of the
distribution was to insure that after the majority shareholder's death, only
active shareholders would remain in the dealership to meet the manufacturer's requirement of franchise renewal. The device clause was not discussed
at all in the ruling, and business purpose was treated as an independent
requirement. Rafferty was cited, but only for the purpose of distinguishing
it on the grounds that the business purpose there was primarily personal and
the effect on the corporate business was conjectural.
The first conclusion which can be drawn from this survey of the post1954 cases concerning the business purpose doctrine is that the law in this
area abounds in conflict and confusion. Depending on the circuit in which
the taxpayer resides, he may be faced with the corporate/shareholder purpose
distinction, the step-business purpose requirement, the transactional analysis
from Rafferty, or some combination, and it is quite possible that even if
the taxpayer shows that the transaction does not lend itself to a bail-out, he
131 Id. at 873.
132 Rev.
Rul. 75-337, 1975-21978
CuM. BULL. 124.
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will still be required to satisfy some business purpose test. The problem is
that this doctrine introduces a huge element of uncertainty into business
dealings. In this area of the Code, it is important to be able to forecast
accurately the tax effects of a particular transaction. It is a fact, however,
that whenever proof of motive becomes the prime factor in determining the
tax effects of a given transaction, uncertainty will reign.
The approach used by the First Circuit in Rafferty was an improvement.
At least in this case, the analysis of taxpayer motivation was eliminated
where the possibility of effecting a bail-out was slight. But if the transactional
analysis of Rafferty indicates bail-out potential, the taxpayer must again
take his chance with the wheel of fortune. The business purpose doctrine
has not worked well enough in the reported cases either to protect the revenues in the case of a bail-out or to protect the taxpayer where there is no
bail-out.
CONCLUSION

This article has examined legislative and judicial efforts to prevent
bail-out transactions and at the same time to allow corporate divisions which
are not bail-outs. The problem in this area arises from the fact that bail-outs
are planned and purposeful attempts to manipulate the tax laws. In attempting
to control such manipulation, the courts have examined motives. It is this
examination which has led to the complex and confusing doctrines of business
purpose. It is at least arguable that in drafting Section 355, Congress attempted to solve the problem of bail-outs by an objective approach. The
legislative history, however, is unclear and it is possible that Congress,
uncertain that the objective tests provided in Section 355 would solve the
problem, intended to include the judicial doctrines as a further safeguard.
The landmark case in this area is Rafferty. Its significance is that
it uses an objective test to detect bail-outs. Taxpayers attempting to structure
bail-outs can be detected by the results of their efforts, not by their motives
for those efforts. The great improvement under the Rafferty test is that
transactions which cannot be bail-outs will no longer be condemned as
such. A case in point discussed earlier is Perry E. Bondy. Bondy spun off
the real estate connected with his business, but there was no possible bail-out
because the stock of the spun-off corporation was tied up in escrow in
connection with Bondy's divorce. The Tax Court held against Bondy,
and the Fourth Circuit, for him. It could easily have been the other way
around. The point is that there was no reason to consider motive. Bondy
could not bail out, so he had no bad motive; or if he did, it was ineffective
The Rafferty court retained the business purpose doctrine as an ad-
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so intending has engineered a potential bail-out. It can be argued that this
is a justifiable safe harbor to prevent unexpected and possibly ruinous taxation. The problem again is that the business purpose doctrine is too complex
and unreliable to be allowed to determine taxation even at this stage.
If Rafferty is followed, those taxpayers who divide their corporations
and who cannot effect a bail-out are safe. Those who can effect a bail-out
fall into two categories: those who intended to bail-out and those who did
not. Since these groups differ only by their motives, i.e., their subjective
intentions, the policy decision remaining seems clear. Either taxation must
be the result of satisfying the two objective tests of Rafferty, or as in that
decision, some form of the business purpose doctrine must be retained in
an attempt to distinguish motives.
The proposed Regulations to Section 355,1"' released on January
21, 1977, although providing the potential for significant improvement to
the approach to bail-out transactions, do not clearly address this policy
decision. In the Regulations, the role of the device clause is expanded to
include both transactions in which stock is sold and those in which it is
retained. Objective criteria have been added to aid in the determination
of whether a transaction which has the potential for the distribution of
earnings and profits is in fact a bail-out. Indications of a bail-out may come
from post-distribution sales of stock, a division in which a substantial portion
of the assets of any post-distribution corporation consists of a new trade
or business, the transfer or retention of cash or liquid assets (not related to
the reasonable needs of the business), and the relationship between the
assets of the distributing and the controlled corporations. This last factor
is illustrated by the situation where the principal function of one corporation
before the transaction is to perform services for or supply technical or
research data to the other corporation and after the transaction, that corporation continues to function on the same basis.
Although these factors are characteristic of certain bail-out transactions, the proposed criteria would be most useful if employed to aid in
answering the questions posed by the Rafferty court: how easily would the
taxpayer be able to liquidate or sell the spun-off corporation and would
this be done without impairing control over the ongoing business. Unfortunately, the proposed Regulations also expand and clarify the Service's
position that business purpose is an equal and additional requirement for
a tax-free corporate division. Both the corporate-shareholder distinction
and the step-business purpose doctrine are specifically used in the examples.
By adopting both the business purpose doctrine and the objective apFed. Reg. 3866 (1977).
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proach as separate and co-equal tests to combat bail-outs, the Service is
preserving the present complexity and confusion. The proposed regulations
should be redrafted to emphasize an objective approach to detecting bailouts by an expansion of the device clause. The objective criteria now found
in the proposed Regulations could be retained to aid in answering the
Rafferty questions. The business purpose doctrine, however, should be
eliminated entirely and taxation imposed whenever objective analysis indicates
potential for bail-out.
The advantages of denying Section 355 treatment to a shareholder
when the assets spun-off are salable without impairment of equity are
several. It would serve to reduce complexity in the tax laws. The business
purpose doctrine has added much complexity by appearing in several forms,
none of which works satisfactorily or has been universally accepted. It
would serve to protect the revenues by requiring immediate taxation every
time a bail-out is imminent; and it would help to provide certainty in a most
complex area. The determination of whether property transferred to a newly
organized corporation has readily realizable value and whether this value
could be obtained without impairing control over the ongoing corporation
would leave questions in close cases, but it is a much better standard with
which to work than the determination of whether the transaction was a
"mere device which put on the form of a corporate reorganization as a
disguise for concealing its real character."'"

134 Gregory, supra note 13, at 469-70.
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